The Iraqi Governing Councilís unanimous decision on Tuesday
December 9, to close the Mojahedin-e Khalq camp at Khales and expel the
3,800 combatants from Iraq by the end of December has thrown the ambiguous
status of the group into sharp relief. The Mojahedin is currently not
completely disarmed and have been allowed to continue their organizational
and political activities in Iraq despite their status as a terrorist group.
Hawks in the US administration may wish to maintain the organization intact
for their own use in relation to Iran.
The US State Department has confirmed that it will support
the IGC decision and act against the Mojahedin. Jordan however has refused
to allow Mojahedin members transit through Jordan as refugees to the west.
The Mojahedin themselves have appealed to the Pentagon to be allowed to
continue to operate as a terrorist group in Iraq on humanitarian grounds.
The Mojahedin will, inevitably, threaten to commit mass suicide if moves are
made to evict them.
Nothing in this offers a solution on its own to the problem
of what should be done to remove the Mojahedin from Iraq nor does it offer a
viable approach to control them for the near and long-term future.
The policy of maintaining the Mojahedin intact to use as a
threat against the Islamic Republic of Iran contains several already well
known flaws beyond the fundamental one of giving support to a terrorist
- As a
priority in the war on terrorism, the Mojahedinís leader Massoud Rajavi
must be tried, as must his mentor and benefactor Saddam Hussein, in an
international court in order to be brought to justice for crimes against
humanity and other criminal acts for which there is a plethora of evidence
The Mojahedin organisation is a cult which exists and operates in its
present strength and shape totally at the behest of Mr Rajavi. His removal
will mean the end of this organisation in its present strength.
any case, Massoud Rajavi cannot share power. His only agenda is total
power. This is incompatible with Iranian and western interests which need
more democratic governance and rule of law in Iran rather than a
protracted power struggle.
Mojahedin have no support inside Iran and do not present a viable
alternative. Now that they no longer operate as an armed force, they
present no threat to the Iranian government. The Mojahedinís propaganda
machine which poses as a political wing is known to regurgitate the
information fed to them by western intelligence and right wing interests,
and is therefore not given credit on this basis as a real opposition.
The IGC decision then poses very difficult questions for the
Coalition forces. No other country will accept the Mojahedin in its current
status as an opposition to Iran. Nor is it desirable to have them relocated
as refugees in the west. They will quickly re-group and the Mojahedin in the
west will then be 3,800 stronger. Only this time it will include a large
proportion of members trained psychologically as well as militarily in
self-sacrificial terrorist activities. That is, a whole band of people
primed, willing and more than able, on the orders of Massoud and Maryam
Rajavi, to burn themselves (and/or others) in the streets of the west, and
to assassinate their opponents in Europe.
Iran-Interlink believes that it is of primary importance to
look upon the Mojahedin not as a military or political entity but as a cult.
This is the only way of dealing successfully with them and bringing them
under control. The following steps are a pre-requisite for this:
Separate ordinary members of the Mojahedin from the internal command
structure of Ďresponsiblesí (massíulin), and halt all need to report to
their superiors. The Mojahedin must be disbanded in situ as a group and
held as individuals and their future determined as individuals. While many
are certainly culpable for crimes committed in Iran, Iraq and elsewhere,
there are many members who continue in the organisation under duress and
these should be given the opportunity to separate from the organisation
only when completely beyond the notorious strictures and manipulations of
the organisationís command structure. Iran has offered to grant amnesty to
ordinary members who have committed no crimes. Members who wish to return
to Iran should be given internationally recognised guarantees that they
will not face punishment.
an extension of this first step, all members of this cult should be
granted total freedom of assembly and contact with one another in order to
reinstate normal relationships. All members should be provided with access
to as wide a variety of media, publications and other external stimulus as
possible in order to reinvigorate analytical thinking and help them to
assess their present status and whether they wish to continue in that way.
Where needed, access to specialists and psychologists should be available.
3,800 cult members must be given free and unfettered access to enjoy
family visits from anywhere in the world, including Iran. A list of
members should be compiled, submitted to and administered by the ICRC so
that families are able to get in touch with their relatives.
Members alleged to have been involved in criminal and/or terrorist acts or
any other suspicious acts which need further investigation should be tried
by an internationally recognised court, whether inside or outside Iraq,
which will determine their guilt or innocence. Trial by opinion or revenge
or media will not help the people of Iran, Iraq or the west.
18 December 2003