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Iran and
Saudi Arabia are edging closer to political instability and even cataclysmic
change. In the case of Iran, the United States prefers a change of regime,
but not for Saudi Arabia. However, regime change might be the eventual
outcome in both countries for reasons that are essentially similar: the
enemies of regimes are inside the borders. But there are also certain
important aspects of dissimilarity in both Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The Islamic revolution occurred in Iran in 1979 as a powerful protest
against a highly corrupt and equally ruthless regime of Mohammad Reza
Pahlevi. At the risk of oversimplification, it should be stated that the
vanguards of that revolution at the very outset made two significant
mistakes whose ramifications might bring about its end.
First, they created a constitution which established the Vilayat-e-Faqih
(rule of the clergy). As such, it made the head clergy (the Supreme Leader)
both infallible and beyond reproach. The concept of infallibility is
essentially an anti-Islamic concept, since from theological perspectives no
one is infallible, save God. At the same time, the notion of the
Vilayat-e-Faqih sowed the seeds for the establishment of a theological
dictatorship, which was going to be as exclusionist of the common people as
the monarchy that it replaced.
The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is fundamentally
anti-democratic in the sense that it allocates too much power to the Supreme
Leader and his handpicked cronies. Only a cursory review of the Iranian
constitution makes it clear that it has created an absolute dictatorship of
the Supreme Leader. The Iranian parliament is held in check by the Council
of Guardians, a body that has power to "examine all laws passed by the
parliament to determine their compatibility with [the] Sharia or Islamic
law". The Supreme Leader appoints half of the members of this council, and
the second half are recommended by the head of the judiciary and confirmed
by parliament. The radically conservative nature of the council may be
underscored by the fact that it has been known to strike down up to 40
percent of the laws passed by the government.
Another powerful body is the Assembly of Experts, which elects the Supreme
Leader from within its ranks and has no record of challenging any of his
decisions. Under the Islamic Republic, Iran might be the only country where
the president of the republic does not control its armed forces. On this
issue as well, the Supreme Leader has ultimate authority.
The second mistake of the Iranian constitution is that there are virtually
no institutional constraints on the authority of the Supreme Leader or
provisions to create some balance between his authority and that of the
president of the Republic, who is an elected official. The Iranian
constitution makes this elected official - indeed the entire executive
branch - subordinate to the Supreme Leader. This theological dictatorship of
the Supreme Leader, along with his cohorts in the Assembly of Experts,
Council of Guardians, Expediency Council and the judiciary have become the
chief enemies from within of the survival of the Islamic Republic. It is
befuddling, then, why Iran even pretends to be a democracy.
Iran is a country in which about 70 percent of the population is below the
age of 30. It is within this age group that the unemployment rate is
reported to be hovering around 24 percent. It seems that Iran's ruling class
and its young population are focused on entirely different agendas. Within
the rank and file of the ruling establishment, the issues of contention are
liberalization of the government (rather, the denial of it) and strict
interpretation of Islam. The youth of Iran, on the contrary, like young
people anywhere else in the world, are driven by their collective ambitions
of getting quality education so that they can get promising jobs and a good
standard of living. Many are also enticed by the consumerism and free
lifestyle of the West. But the hardliners' insistence on making their lust
for the "good life" a crime, becomes just another reason why the feeling of
alienation regarding the Islamic government is reported to be mounting among
young Iranians.
While the hardline ayatollahs see popular demands for liberalization as a
threat to their authority, the liberal or moderate clerics do not fare that
much better among Iranian youth because of their unwillingness to challenge
the hardliners. The hardliners in Iran have learned nothing from the
miserable legacy of the regime of Reza Pahlevi, its brutality, and, above
all, its repudiation to compromise. By wittingly or unwittingly emulating
those traits of the previous regime, the hardline Islamic clerics are
pushing their rule toward the same fate.
The United States is on the sidelines of this brewing struggle in Iran, but
it is not a disinterested party. As much trouble as the Bush administration
is currently encountering, stemming from regime change in Iraq, it would
still welcome a regime change in Iran if it was carried out by the Iranian
youth, a la the Islamic revolution of 1979.
The pro-democracy elements are showing their interests through radio
broadcasts from the comfortable environs of Los Angeles, urging the Iranian
youth to overthrow the ayatollahs. Like Iraqi expatriates in the United
States and Britain, the pro-democracy groups are supported by the American
neo-conservatives. The Mujahideen-e-Khalq has their own fight with the
Islamic regime. They have even approached the Bush administration to use
them as a proxy force to carry out regime change in Iran, much like the
Northern Alliance was used to dismantle the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Despite the disparate endeavors of these groups to oust the Islamic
government from Iran, the chief threat to that country's stability, in the
final analysis, stems from the enemies from within - the hardline ayatollahs
who would rather be swept away by the winds of change than bend and survive.
The problem in Saudi Arabia is similar to that in Iran in the sense that the
legitimacy of the regime faces challenges from within. But the challenge to
the stability of Saudi Arabia stems from a constant pull and push between
the forces of Islamic orthodoxy and the nexus between militant orthodoxy and
al-Qaeda. The general understanding is that the support of that terrorist
organization comes from a number of Sunni Muslim clerics and the population
at large. However, since Saudi Arabia is a closed society, it is well nigh
impossible to make even a reasonable judgment about the actual number of
these supporters. There is little doubt about the strength of their
commitment, though. They will go to any extreme to fulfill their objectives
of ousting the monarchy. The suicide attacks in Riyadh of May 12 were a
declaration of war by these militants on the Saudi monarchy.
The current dilemma for the Saudi government is how much violent tactics it
should use to suppress and eradicate the militant orthodox and their al-Qaeda
cohorts before alienating even a larger portion of its population. At the
same time, in the eyes of their American interlocutors, the government's
willingness to suppress these groups has become a litmus test of its
earnestness in dealing with terrorism.
The Saudi monarchy is going through an unprecedented era when its own
legitimacy is being threatened by the hardcore orthodox-al-Qaeda nexus. At
the same time, its ties with the US have also experienced considerable
strain and tensions. It seems that the Saudi rulers are hearing from both
parties that now-famous line of George W Bush, with a slight modification,
"Either you are with us or you are with the enemy." Except in this case,
they seem to be doomed by choosing either side. But remaining neutral in the
evolving hardball in their polity is not an option.
Stability-related problems of Iran and Saudi Arabia should be viewed in the
larger context of South and West Asia. Afghanistan continues to be highly
volatile. Pakistan's domestic tranquility remains a mirage. Further west of
Pakistan, Iraq is a place where the escalating spirals of anti-Americanism
have pushed all prospects of stability into the distant future. If Iran and
Saudi Arabia were also to face instability, then the world might witness
chaos on a very large scale.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based
independent strategic analyst.
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