Who is the MEK? Why are they protected in Iraq?

Part one of the series
Part two in the series

Background primer

The MEK are a leftist terrorist organization which was created in 1965 as a revolutionary alternative in Iran. In the 70s, the MEK killed a handful of US civiilians and condoned the US Embassy hostage taking. In the early 80s, the MEK fled Iran to Iraq and fought on Saddam Hussein's side in the Iran-Iraq war. In the early 90s, the MEK played Saddam's hitmen in slaughtering the Shia and Kurds. At the onset of the Iraq war, the US bombed their bases in Iraq, eventually agreeing to a cease-fire agreement. The neoconservatives arranged that the MEK be placed under the Geneva Conventions and protected by the US in Camp Ashraf for their future use in toppling the Iranian regime. The MEK have been so highly prized that a deal with Iran for five senior Al Qaeda members (including Zarqawi) was nixed.

The deal for Al Qaeda members

Among those in custody were Abu Mussab al Zarqawi (who later set up base in Iraq and has been the mastermind of the Iraq insurgency), Saad bin Laden, one of OBL's sons, Al Qaeda spokesman Suleiman abu Gaith, and Saif al-Adel, intelligence chief and number three in the Al Qaeda organization.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the head of the powerful Expediency Council, on May 6, 2003 said, "In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the U.S., Washington was portraying itself as anti-terrorist, but it entered into a deal with a terrorist group which they have nurtured and given a safe haven in Washington." Some two weeks later, Iran and the US diplomats secretly entered talks that would send Al Qaeda members from Iran to the US and MEK members from Iraq (where they have US protection) to Iran. The Iranians vowed amnesty to the MEK members it would receive and that it would not pursue the death penalty. Reportedly, Jordan's King Adbullah II was also quietly trying to facilitate a deal between the US and Iran.

The deal never materialized. Flynt Leverett, in charge of Middle East policy for the NSC until the spring of 2004 said, "Why we didn't cut this deal is beyond me." Part of the US counter argument included that many of the senior level officials of the MEK have fled to Europe. If that's the case, wouldn't the US have simply given over the lower level agents of the MEK they had in return for the five senior Al Qaeda members? Something doesn't add up.

Bush's own reaction about a proposed trade was reportedly, "Why not? They're terrorists."Source

Regarding the Al Qaeda members for MEK members trade, "The State Department is said to have favored such a deal, but the Pentagon balked - arguing that the [MEK] might be useful in fomenting regime change in Tehran." This would explain the hesitance in giving over lower level members. The neoconservatives had designs to put these grunts to use in the future and not even US security could trump their idealistic desire of 'liberating' (creating chaos) in the Middle East.

Raymond Tanter (a prominent neoconservative) and Patrick Clawson, of The Washington Institute, gave their rationale for objecting to the trade: the future use of Al Qaeda members by Iran as currency, "In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration sent U.S. arms to Iran in exchange for the release of Americans held hostage in Beirut by surrogates of the regime in Tehran. Once Iran saw that American hostages were valuable trading items, it responded by taking even more hostages. Few would regard this experience as a triumph for U.S. diplomacy. The recently proposed trade of al-Qaeda leaders in Iran for MEK members in Iraq would replicate many of the problematic features of the 1980s arms-for-hostages deal. By trading thousands of MEK members for a few al-Qaeda leaders, Washington would make al-Qaeda figures a valuable unit of commerce for Tehran. Such an incentive would likely encourage Iran to provide safe harbor to additional al-Qaeda members in order to pave the way for further bartering with the United States."..."Another problem with the proposed trade is that it would forestall any attempt to fairly try MEK members on credible terrorism charges." Here, Tanter implicitly assumes that there are some credible terrorism charges to try some of the MEK. If so, then why would the United States grant them unverisal protection and not seek any prosecution of MEK members whatsoever? Further, "Moreover, the UN Convention against Torture, to which the United States is a party, forbids handing accused parties over to states that systematically employ torture."

First, how could Iran create incentive for Al Qaeda future members to stay in Iran after they've given Al Qaeda members to the US? The notion doesn't make strategic sense. If anything, Al Qaeda members would be less likely to consider Iran as safe haven. Secondly, on treatment of terrorists once turned over, Iran could say the same thing about handing over Al Qaeda members to the US. Simply put, they wouldn't receive MEK's prized Geneva Convention protection. The bottom line, if you want to win the war on terror, you make the exchange. The potential intelligence this exchange could have resulted in far outweighed the benefits of retaining a marginally-supported revolutionary group. There comes a time when the national security of the US should be more important than the neoconservative lust for toppling leaders they hate. By nullifying this deal, the neoconservatives once again prove that they don't care about winning the war on terror. Source of Tanter and Clawson's reply

Juan Cole comments on the exchange:

Cole also cites a Jerusalem Post article, suggesting that meetings between now-indicted Larry Franklin of the AIPAC espionage investigation, Manucher Ghorbanifar, Harold Rhodes and SISMI officials dealt directly with the MEK-AQ exchange.

Is the proposed MEK-AQ exchange part of the substance in the Presidential Directive Franklin was indicted for giving to Israel?

In the 80's, Ghorbanifar advocated the central role of the MEK in overthrowing the Iranian regime and was also involved in Iran Contra.

Cole continued: