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MA: I was speaking to a former Iraqi opposition leader last year, and he
told me that publicly the United States advocated regime change in Iraq
after 1991, but privately they still entertained the option of
rehabilitating the regime at some point in the future. How credible is this?
DA: The U.S. needed to maintain Saddam Hussein primarily as a bulwark
against the Iranian regime. You know that they sponsored the
Mojahedin-e-Khalq….
MA: Interesting that you point this out. That was surely one of the former
Iraqi regime's links to terrorism.
***
DA: Yes. But in the wider regional framework, apart from the nuisance that
Saddam posed to Iran, he also acted as a counter-weight against both the
Syrians and the Saudis. Therefore, the upshot is that there was a strategic
need to maintain a contained and caged Saddam Hussein.
MA: What was the primary reason behind the Iraqi sponsorship of the
Mojahedin-e-Khalq?
DA: One primary reason of course was the Faylaq al-Badr [the armed wing of
SCIRI] which was sponsored by Iran and deployed alongside the border;
therefore the Iraqis needed a counter-balance. Secondly, the west, either
directly or indirectly, were approving of this policy, as the
Mojahedin-e-Khalq had proved to be an effective terrorist force against
Iran.
MA: What is going to happen to the Mojahedin-e-Khalq remnants in Iraq?
DA: I believe the new Iraqi state will have a strategic interest in keeping
the Mojahedin-e-Khalq as a disarmed, inactive-but certainly not
dismantled-force in Iraq.
MA: This is very interesting. But most evidence suggests that the Iraqis
want them out as their presence is likely to complicate relations with Iran.
DA: Certainly Iraqi forces sponsored by Iran want them out. But I think the
practical Iraqi politicians realize that the Mojahedin-e-Khalq are a useful
bargaining chip.
MA: But the rationale for keeping them in Iraq has now completely
disappeared. Iran no longer hosts any Iraqi opposition groups or any group
for that matter which seeks to undermine Iraq.
DA: There are still a number of unresolved problems between Iraq and Iran.
The Algiers agreement of 1975 and the issue of Iraqi deportees count amongst
them. Therefore the dismantling of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq will probably take
place in the framework of a broader settlement between the two states. I
think this is the American view as well. They are telling the Iranians that
we are keeping these people disarmed but there is always the possibility of
reviving them, therefore if you want them dismantled, you will have to make
some concessions.
MA: But you don't think the MKO [Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization] can be
re-armed?
DA: No, I think they will remain neutralized both militarily and
politically.
***
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